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1« Introduction
The purpose of this study is to investigate home buying during the
New Jersey Graduated Work Incentive Experiment. The importance of such an
analysis appears to be at least five-fold.
First, Wooldridge [9] in a detailed and thought-provoking analysis of
many different housing issues, and Nicholson [5] in a somewhat less detailed
analysis, both reached the conclusion that there existed a definite experi-
mental effect on homeownership. Specifically, Wooldridge f s analysis found
that experimentals who were over-breakeven at pre-enrollment bought hoae»
at a statistically higher rate (about 5%) than their control counterparts by
the end of the experiment. Since the over-breakeven experimentals were
eligible to receive payments if their incomes dropped sufficiently, the
explanation put forth by Wooldridge was that the guaranteed income gave
this group the "financial security" to purchase homes,"... not only in
their own eyes, but in- the eyes of potential lending agencieB." While
this latter supply side explanation does not seem consistent with finding
an experimental affect at the end of the experiment, this supposingly non-
payment experimental effect is interesting enough in its own right to re-
ceive added attention. Furthermore, since home buying by experimentals
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a costless (for the administrators of the experiment) treatment, its
validity should he rigorously investigated.
Second, the results of the entire experiment are subject to the
criticism that they reflect responses to a temporary three year experiment
which differ from those that would be observed in a permanent national plr.n.
As Metcalf and Nicholson [3, p. 1] point out:
"... many methodologica- approaches "o analyzing the effects
of a negative Income tax view houslolds as making coordinated
decisions regarding labor-force behavior, consumption behavior,
and asset accumulation. Evidence that households view experimental
payments as a -transitory income source would therefore be an im-
portant indicator that the labor supply erfects of a permanent
income maintenance program may not correspond to observed behavior
during the experimental."
Similarly, evidence that households view payments as a pemauent in-
come source would give additional credibility to the validity of labor
supply results for a permanent national plan. There appears to be near
unanimous agreement that hone buying is a function of "normal" or "penaa-
3
nent" income rather then transitory income. Hence, increased hone buying
among experimental families receivi
.g payments would tupporf the belief
,4
that experimental families viewed the payments as "permanent.
Third, any strong positive experimental effect among nonwhites compared
to whites may help tc reduce limitations on homeownerrhip found among non-
whites as a result c e discrimination. As Kain and Quigley [2, p. 273] heve
noted, "Homeownership is clearly the most important method of wealth accumu-
lation used by low- and middle- income families in the postwar period."
Furthermore, they go on to estimate that "... an effective limitation on
homeownership can increase Negro housing costs by over 30 per cent, assuming
no price appreciation."
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Fourth, for both whites and nonwhites, low homeowner.oh ip rates imply
ineligibility from favorable treatm nt accorded horaeoi.nera under federal
income tax laws. To the extent that experimental can increase their
home buying, they can become eligible for substantial savings in tax breaka.
Fifth, regardless of experimental questions, the panel nature of the
data permits a more sophisticated analysis of home buying than is normally
possible with cross-sectional studies due to the availability of a "normal 1
'
income variable.
In light of these considerations, the claimed experimental effect on
home buying is critically investigated in the remainder of this study.
The plan of attack is as follows. Section 2 discusses the selection of
the "appropriate" sample (which incidently differs markedly from the one
used by Wooldridge [9]. Section 3 then outlines the probit model used in
the analysis, leaving to section 4 a description of the independent variables,
Empirical results are conteined in section 5 and section 6 attempts to recon-
cile them with previous studies.
2. Sample Selection
The selection of the sample in this study is crucially important.
Wooldridge [9] used a sample of 776 families, each observed at pre-enroll-
ment and quarters four, eight, and twelve. Nicholson's [5] sample consisted
of 750 families each observed at quarters four, 3ix t eight, and twelve.
The present sample differs from both of these in two important aspects.
First, attention is restricted to the "continuous sample" of 693 families
which has formed the basis of many of the analyses of the experiment. Thir
restriction allows fcr the use of the normal income variable constructed
by Watts [8]. Second, and more importantly, attention is restricted to
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only those families who moved (25 7) or those who changed their tenure
status wit .out moving (16). Thiy atter group consists of families who
apparently bought the house they had been renting. The reasons for
restricting attention to only those families who changed their housing
status are multi-fcld:
(1) With regard to differences in ethnicity, Kain and Quigley [2, p. 265]
remark: "There are some indications that the barriers to Negro
occupancy in white neighborhoods are gradually declining. Thus,
it could be argued that current ownership patterns primarily reflect
historical discrimination and provide a misleading view of current
conditions."
(2) In addition Kain and Quigley [2, pp. 265-6] go on to argue: "Because
of past discrimination, Negro movers are less likely than white
movers to have been homeowners in the past. This is important
because when homeowners change their residence they are more likely
to buy than to rent and, conversely, when renters move they are
more -ikely to move from ore i.ental property to another."
(3) Along the same lines, current home-buying opportunities may not
differ across sites by as much a3 the historically- influenced pre-
enrollment differences fo-u.^ by '/ooldridge [9, pp. 5-7]. Specifi-
cally, pre-enroiiment homeovnerhhip rates for Trenton, Paterson-
Passaic, Jersey City, and Scranton were 19.7, 5.5, 6.0, and 29.3
per cent, respectively, ror Wooldririge's sample.
(4) Even more pertinent to the analysis of possible experimental effects
on home buying, it teeu irrelevant to study experimentais (or for
that fact controls; who never moved or changed their housing statue
during the experiment. "larher, the appropriate sample in which to
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look lor experimental effects on home buying is one limited
only t ' potential home buyers. Dy using samples such as
Wooldridge's or Nicholson' v , experimental home purchasing effects
could be mistal'.ingly confused vith other experimental effects
such as the ability of experimental to retain the homes they
already live in at a higher rate than their control counterparts.
For these reasons this study focuses attention solely on the condi-
tional probability of buying a home given a move or change in tenure
status. This permits uncovering an experimental effect on home buying
over an above a simple experimental effect on mobility. Indeed, since an
improvement in housing made by moving into a "better" rental unit is a
much lower cost action than buying a house, it is a more likely candidate
in which to find an experimental effect due to a three year negative
income tax experiment.
A detailed description of the 273 observations comprising the sample
is provided in the Appendix. Table Al, A3, and A5 b-eak down this sample
according to ethnicity, experimental 3tatu3, site, and year. Tables A2,
A4, and A6 give the same breakdown for the 80 observations corresponding
to home buyers. Because quarterly housing data is not available on a
regular basis, the base time period is a year.
Very briefly the importance of these tablej lies in the raw experi-
mental-control differentials in probabilities of home buying contained
therein. Specifically, experimental advantages of .2687 vs .1765 end
.4462 vs .3793 for whites and blacks, respectively, an^ a control advantage
of .2500 vs. .1622 for Spanish-speakers. Thus while the positive experi-
mental effect found by Wooldridge [9] and Nicholson [5] seems evident
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for whites and blacks, the rxaci opposite seems to be the case for
Spanish-speakers. Furthermore, pre .ounced ethnic differences are appar-
ent in levels as well as in differentia's. Thin is not surprising In
light of the numerous ethnic differences which have been noted elsewhere
in analyses of the experiment, however, the studies of both Wooldrtd, i
and Nicholson allow for ethnic differences onlv throt gh simple interrept
dummies. In contrast the analysis of Section 5 will deal with ethnic
differences by a complete depooling of whites, blacks, and Spanish-speakers
Analysis will then .proceed to determine whether each of these differences
can be explained by factors other than those of the experiment.
3. Probit Model
Let y (J 1, 2,...,n) be a binary variable indicating whether the
jth family purchased a home (y 1) or did not purchase a heme (y 0).
Let x - [x , x ,..., x ] (j - 1, 2,...,n)(k < n) be a row vector of
J J-*- J ^ J k
socio-economic-experimental variables pertinent to making this purchase
decision, l:t fl - [6 , 6_,..., 3, ]' be the corresponding column vec.or of
coefficients, and let I be an index for the jth family which is a linear
function of the regressors, i.e., T
4
- x 6 Cj - l,2,...,n). The probit
j J
model used in this stuoy postulates the existence of btandard normal randorr
*
variables I (J - 1 , ?,..., n) such that the home purchasing decision can
be described by
U - 1: 2 n).
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In this context the decision of the Jth family to buy a hone is assumed to
be a function of the regressor6 (v: - 1 the index I ) nn* of the random
variable I which serves as a disturbance term.
Denoting by P(z) the value of the standard ncrnAl cumulative distri-
bution evaluated at z, the probability ui the jth family buying a home is
Prob (y - 1 1 X > Prob (I < ijl.) - F(I ), and the probability of not
buying Prob {y - 0|l.} Prob fl' > I |l } - l-F(I ). Assuming ind<
-
J .. j J J J
pendence among family decisions, and ord?ring the sample so
that the first m observations correspond to families who bought, and
the remaining n - r observations to those who did not buy, the log-likclihooc
of the sample is
m n
L - iuL - 2^ InF(I-) + Z- to[i - F(I )]
j-1 j-m-ri
Setting the derivatives of (1) with respect to B, , B 2> ..., S. equal
to zero yields nonlinear normal equations whose solution is the maximum like-
lihood (ML) estimator tf - [B. , 3 ,..., 3.)'. The ML estimator 3 is consist-
ent, asymptotically efficient, and has an asymptotic normal distribution »:itn
mean B and a variance-covarir.nce matrix which can be approximated by
.2,1-1
6 L
aese*:
j s-e
4 . Independent VariaMe Selection
The row vector x, of independent variables for the Jth family CA1
J
be conveniently partitioned into socio-economic-demographic variables 'Mich
affect the decision of all families in buying a home, md into "treatment"
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variables vtiich affect only the experiment rroup. With regard co the fi^sc
set, the following variables (besidtj a constant) form the basis for the
subsequent analysis.
First and foremost, average normal family income (in thousands of dollars)
for the year In which the move occurred is included as a regressor. As
indicate! in Section 1, economic theory clearly implies that a normal income
type of variable should be used instead o r a transitory Income variable.
Furthermore, unlike current income, normal income has been purged of any
g
experimental effect. Normal income is expected to have a strong positive
effect on the probability of purchasing a home, and because of the ^ay it
was constructed, its effect may "swamp" that of many other non-experimental
variables.
Besides normal income (which includes non-work-conditioned unearned
income;, worh-condition unearned income (measured in thousands of dol.'.arn,)
is also included as an earnings regressor. Thi3 permits explicit recogni-
tion of welfare payments which often have been neglected In other s'rdies.
Since welfare status may indeed reflect a treatment effect, especially
among experimentals on the least generous plans, an additional regressor is
included which interacts welfare payments with an experimental dummy.
Second, the prior tenure of the family is accounted for by the inclusion
of dummies for families 1 Lving Ln public housing aad for families who own
homes . To the extent that public housing is the least desirable tenure
status, a family Jiving in quelle : jusing would 1 cBtt likely to "Jenp"
all the wry up to the highest leveJ oi tenure stntus, namelv hopeownershlp
than a private renta-i family. By the same token, an urrument along the
lines of Kain and Cuigley to he mentioned in section 2, indicates that once
a family owns and then moves, it is likely to buy again. However, considering
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the low Income levels of the sample, it. could be that once a family owns a
house they i.ave In a =><_r.ae reached he apex of their lifetime housing consump-
tion curve, and henv_e they are unlikely to move unless It is a forced move -
possibly due to mortgage for closure. ' While this latter hypo the tjir. cannot
be testec directly, I . possible explanation for tailing to observe a
significantly positive effect o r prior ownership such as found by 1'aln and
Quigley [2, pp. 266-7].
Third, as in most homeovnersMp tttidieo, family life cycle variables
are included. These include the number of kids between the ages 6 and 15,
the number of family members other than the head, Epouse, and kids ages 6-15,
and the head's age. Kids ages 6-15 are expected to exert a positive influence
on the probability of purchase since it is during this school age period that
their presence necessitates larger housing space, expecially additional bed-
rooms. Pre-school children are much easier to accomodate (e.g., by sharing
of bedrooms with many other people), especially infants. An increase in
the number of other family members is also likely to have a positive effect
on the probability of purchase, albeit, to a lesser degree. The effect of
the head '8 age, over and above its influence on income, is expected to be
positive, however, its influence is not expected to be as great as that
found in other studies because of the inclusion of normal income.
Fourth, in the face of the large differences in current homeovnership
patterns acrc3s site-j noted In section 2, durrmy variables are included for
Paterson-Passaic , Jersey City, and Scranton. A p r 1 o - i j ;. seems that site
along with ethnitity 1 s a legitimate criterion to consider for depooling.
Unfortunately, small sample sizes raise problems, ^nd hence only one case
can be considered, namely whites in Scranton.
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Fifth, mortgage rate and calendar time are included as repressors.
The mortgage rate series used is th< FHLBB effective rite on existing homes
which reflects fees and charges as well as contract rates, and assume.", pre-
payment at the end of ten years. The data were taken from Federal Re s erve
Bulletins (December, 1968 thru January, 1973), and the actual rate used wa9
the average of the two middle months in the year in which the family moved.
The rationale for the inclusion of the mortgage rate is as an indicator of
the cost of buying a home, as well as an indicator of supply side effects.
Calendar time is used to capture trends in homebuying and to take into
account differences in market conditions facing families moving at different
times. The actual values used for mortgage rates and calendar time are
given in Tables A7 .and A8.
With regard to treatment variables the following regressors are used:
an experimental dummy (equalling one for an experimental family)
,
yearly
experimental payments (measured in thousands of dollars), experimental
time (equalling the midyear points .5, 1.5, and 2.5 respectively, for
each of the three years), and two experimental interactions, one with the
head' 8 age and one with work-conditioned unearned income. The use of experi-
mental payments provides a simple parsimonius representation of the treat-
ment which differentiates not only between experimentals and controls, but
also between experimentals receiving payments and those who are over break-
even. Because of the often fruitless results that have been encountered
with explicit tax ar.d guarantee representations, as well as their failure
to identify experimentals not receiving payments, the payments approach
has been adopted.
Experimental time is included in order to determine whether any po ;siMe
experiment effect may tend to occur at say the end of the experiment as
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Wooidridge [9] found. Kb ni 1 :: Cloned earlier the exper imrntal interaction
with work-Conditioned unearned inco e lfl Intended to capture, any txperi-
mental effects which may arise through welfare status. The exper iniertal
interaction with the heal s a^e permits experimental families that are
farther along in their life cycle cf consumption (and possibly having
additional assets) to react differently than families with younger heads
and which may Just be starting out. Indeed the youthfulness of the sample
indicates that many families will be Just entering into the home buying
age bracket, and hence experimental-age interactions are possible.
5. Empirical Results
In light of the ethnic differences noted earlier, the decision to
estimate each ethnicity separately was first tested. A pooled model
with the eighteen variables described in section A was estimated and
yielded a log-likelihood value of -132.5. Then separate models were esti-
mated for each ethnicity yielding the log-liklihood values given in Table
2. The Scranton dummy was omitted f-ora the black and Spanish-speaking
models because there were no families in Scranton. Furthermore, the prior
owner dummy was omitted from the Spanish-speaking model because neither
of the two prior owners "in the sample bought a home — implying that its
coefficient cannot be estimated (see Poirier [6]). The explanatory power
of the additional thirty-one variables in the black and Spanish-speaking
models was then tested by computing -2 times the increase in the log-likeli-
hood. This yielded a test siatistic of >. 66.60 which is significant at
the one per cent level. Thus the decision to depool the ethnicities appears
13
to be consistent with the sample information.

Tabls I
Problt C Lclcntl with Standard Erros in Parentheses
Coeff icl«-r.: Variable
3
,
B.
8i»
Whites
^L
Black.fi Spanish-apeikers
Cocb:
Normal incone
Work-conditioned income
Prior owner dtll
Public housing dune
Nunber of kids n^ei 6-15
Fanlly aire - 2 - kida 6-15
Head's age
PaterBon-pRBflai d duaay
Jersey City dusny
Scranton dunny
Calender tise
Mortgage rate
1.420
.1247*
(.07002)
-.853i**
;. 3750)
.3974
(.6611)
-.1870
(.4528)
.2375
(.1483)
.2712
(.1935)
-.09260***
(.03370)
-.4319
(.9066)
-1.676
(1.259)
-.5992
(1.079)
-.03378
(.04144)
.2252
(.7609)
-21.76***
(6.873)
.2640***
(.08682)
-.3637
(.26b9)
.4688
(.7269)
-.050?6
.4123
.1784
(.1088)
-.1658
(.1345)
.08018**
.03952
-1.569**
(.6966)
-2.121***
(.8220)
.1149***
.043.^1
1.930***
(.7396)
-4.611
(15.08)
.5606**
(.2341)
-.2412
(.2763)
1.041
(1.223)
.1506
(.2697)
.1372
(.3320)
.03424
(.06632)
-2.568
(2.184)
-1.506
(2.070)
.00743.1
(.06034)
.007213
(1.853)
i||
•A
ill
s
i
17
. I
Experimental dusmy
Experimental paynents
Expert* ital 1
1
(Experi
Vread'i age)
(Experl-'.T.t. ' . .--
-4.867**
(2.004)
.1483
(.1873)
.230 b
(.4600)
.0986/**
(.04*34)
.5121
•(Work-condll tac) I ( . I
4. 1 72**
2.014
-.1034
(.1810)
-1.332***
(.5189)
-.04768
(.04691)
.2873
'.. 3220)
-11.94
(8.216)
-2.161*
(1.233)
.1666
(.8636)
.1062
(.1874)
-3.256
(2.541)
*Througbou: this study "**• " "**," and "*" will denote significance at th«
one, five, and ten 3<:rc< . lis, respectively.
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Table 2
Probit Statistics
Statis tic Description
1
i ______
Whites Blacks Spanish-apea'-
n Sample size 118 94 61
Number of buyers 27 40 12
k-1 Degrees of freedom 17 16 15
L Log-likelihood -42.41 -42.37 -14.45
X -2* (log-likelihood ra tio) 42.10*** 43.48*** 31.58***
Table 3
Likelihood Ratio Tests
Test
rer Description Whiter Blacks Spanish-speakers
1
Work-conditioned income
< B
3
" £ 18
=
°>
9. 394*** 1.935 6.893**
2
Prior tenure
(6^ - B$ - 0)
.5770 .4862 - - -
3
Family characteristics
(S
6
= 6 7 -6,-0) 13.41*** 11.56*** 2.539
4
Head's age
(2
e
- S
:?
- 0)
10.33*** 5.901* 8.446**
5
Site
(8 - B - 6 )
2.840 7.870** 4.233
6
Calender time and mortgage rate
(Bla = Sn - 0)
1.783 11.83*** .02180
7
Experimental variable
(S fl -... flV U M l 5 18 0)
9.232 10.85* 9.827*
8
Experimental interactions
(3 - 6 - 0)
1 7
M
l 8
'
7.734** 1.69 6.758**
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Th* probit coefficients for each of the three ethnic models .ire
presented Ln Table 1. Standard Statistics srs given in Table 2, and the
liklihooa ratio tests for various groups of independent variables are
given in Table 3. Considering these tables the following remarks seem in
order.
With regard to e.irnln^s, as expected, normal income is significant
and positive in all three models, albeit, to a lesser degree in t he case of
whites. Work-condit ioacd unearned income is consistently negative (and
significant in the case of whites), most likely reflecting the fact that
families with sizeable welfare payments have few assets and are probably
unlikely to be able to get a mortgage. Furthermore, there is little
evidence that the response for experimentals to work-conditioned unearned
income differs from that of controls, although in the case of whites
and blacks it tends to lessen the previously mentioned negative response.
For Spanish-speakers the experimental response reinforces the negative
response and the joint effect is significant (see Test 1 in Table 3).
Prior tenure status has virtually no effect on the home buying decision
for any of the ethnicities (see Test 2 in Table 3). This result is some-
what surprising since besides the rationale for its inclusion presented
in section £, prior tenure was thought to be an excellent proxy for assets.
As Kain and Quigley [2, p. 269] note, "For most households , black and white,
equity in owner-occupied housing is itself the largest component of net
worth."
Family characteristics are significant for whites and blacks, but
not for Spanish-speakers (see Test 3 in Table 3) . As expected the number
of kids ages 6-15 has a consistent positive effect although it is not

-15-
qulte significant at the 101 level. The same holds for family size except
that its effect is negative for blocks. The coefficient of the head's
age has the expected sign for blacks and Spanish-speakers (significant
for blacks), houevcr, it is negative and significant for whites. The
"explanation" for this seems to lie in the youthfulness of the controls
who bought (see Table A). Interestingly, the experimental response inter-
acts positively (and significantly) with the head's age for whites and in
effect wipes out the significant negative effect for controls. For all
three models the Joint effect of the head's age is significant (see Test
4 in Table 3).
Surprisingly, site is significant only for blacks, (see Test 5 in Table
3) , although Trenton (the omitted site) consistently fares better in all
three models. As mentioned in section 2, the historic differences in home-
ownership rates across sites do not seem indicative of the housing markets
during the experiment.
Calendar time and the mortgage rate are significant determinants of
the home buying decision only in the case of blacks (see Test 6 in Table 3)
.
The consistently positive coefficient for the mortgage rate seems to indi-
cate that what is being measured is not effect of a housing "price" but
rather other effects which are correlated with movements in interest rates.
Of course the independent variables of primary interest are the experi-
mental variables. The Joint teat on all experimental variables (Test 7
in Table 3) indicates that there is a slight experimental effect for all
ethnicities (the test for whites Just misses being significant at the 10
per cent level). However, the nature of this response differs markedly
across ethnicities. The weakest response is for whites and the experimental-
age interaction accounts for a great deal of it. While experimental payments
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Table 4
Head's Average
Group Whites Blai Span 1 sh-speakera
Controls 40.33 35.89 35.47
Buyers 33.05 39.82 39.82
Non-buyers 41.89 33.49 34.02
Experlmentals 35.30 35.02 37.63
Buyers 36.38 36.46 42.48
Non-buyers 34.91 33.87 36.69
Table 5
Suaunary of Predicted Probabilities
Whites Blacks
J
!
Spanish-speakers
Average for non-buyers
Average for buvers
Using Independent
variable ireans
1517
4806
1362
.2638
.6521
.1966
.09451
.6117
.2007
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are not significant, their positive sign, together with the negative and
statistically significant dummy coefficient, indicates that experimentals
near their breakeven point have a negative response. In fact for a mean-
aged white experimental midway through the experiment who is receiving no
work-conditioned unearned income, the estimated experimental response does
not become positive until payments reach $7000.
In the case of blacks the experimental response is significant and
positive for those receiving little or not payments. Specifically, for
a mean-aged black experimental midway through the experiment who is not re-
ceiving work-conditioned unearned income, the estimated response is positive
up to a payments level of $4877. This somewhat strange response — posi-
tive for those not- receiving payments — is similar to that found by
Wooldridge [9]. However, the negative and experimental coefficient of
experimental time indicates that the greatest response occurred at the be-
ginning of the experiment. This is consistent with the argument that the
experiment provided security for over-breakeven experimentals to buy a
home early in the year. As pointed out earlier, Wooldridge [9], somewhat
confusingly, found this security effect setting in at the end of the
experiment.
The experimental response for Spanish-speakers is different from that
of both whites and blacks. The coefficient of the experimental dummy Is
negative, and the payments coefficient is not only negative and significant,
but its absolute value is much larger than that for either whites or blacks.
The implication is that experimentals not receiving payments had a negative
response and this response became more negative as payments increased.
The evidence clearly indicates that a negative response was present for
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Spanish- speakers.
Looking deeper, a few more inrights into the experimental responses
can be found. In the case of blacks and Spanish-speakers (both of which
had negative responses to payments), the payments coefficient is signifi-
cantly different (at the 5 per cent level) from the normal income coeffi-
cient. In the case of whites (for which the payments coefficient is posi-
tive), it is virtually the same as the normal income coefficient.
Considering Table 5, the ratio of average predicted probabilities of
buyers to non-buyers is greatest for Spanish-speakers (over 6 to 1) and
less for whites (about 3 to 1) and blacks (about 2h to 1). Considering
Table 6, the average predicted probabilities among buyers are nearly identi-
cal for experimentals and controls in all three models. However, among non-
buyers the experimental-control averages do differ somewhat. Further break-
ing down these averages by site results in rather eradic patterns.
Finally, two subgroups of special interest were further analyzed and
they yielded the results presented in Tables A9 - A12. The first subgroup
was formed by deleting those black families who bought the house they were
renting. This amounted to a comparatively large eleven families (versus
four for whites, and one for Spanish-speakers). The major differences in
the results from subgroup (mover) model from the model considered earlier
are that site, calendar time, and the mortgage rate are no longer signifi-
cant. The explanation for this is somewhat elusive, but it may point out a
data artifact in these observations. The experimental response is basically
the same as noted for the black model in this section except that experi-
mental time is no longer significant and the age-experimental interaction now is.
The second subgroup consists of only those whites in Scranton. This is
the only subgroup large enough to permit depooling by both site and ethnicity.
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Table 6
Breakdown of Average Predicted Probabilities
Non-buyera
ControlH I Experimental*
Buyers
Coatroln I Hxpcrimentals
Whites
Trenton
scan
nuober
Paterson-Passaic
swan
nuober
Jersey City
1122
nuober
Scranton
aeir.
nunber
2113
3
1046
39
.1856
.3817
2
.4006
8
.1505
4
,1293
35
.4730
.5529
1
.0461
1
,5226
7
.4844
.6194
2
.5491
6
.4185
10
Black* ,2289 ,2812 ,6406 .6564
Trenton
moan .3358 .3627 .5943 .6574
nuober 5 4 5 3
Paterson-Pajsaic
•ean .2811 .2265 .9085 .6646
number 2 '1 2 8
Jersey City
nean .1708 .2943 .5646 .6526
nuober 11 21 4 18
Spanish-speakers .1252 .07670 .6116 .6119
Trenton
mean .0662 .5659
nuaber 6 1
Pateraoa-Pasaaic
swan .0814 .0763 .3140 .6919
nuaber 5 14 1 3 •
Jersey City
ean .1421 .0828 .6711 .5149
nuabsr 13 11 5 2
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A* noted earlier, historical housing patterns might suggest strong differ-
ences across sites. However, as Tt ;t 5 in Table 3 suggests, there is little
difference between the Scranton-only model and the white model considered
earlier. The main difference is that the experimental response is slightly
stronger and the payment coefficient is now significant at the 10 per cent
level. The nature of this response remains the same.
6. Conclusion
The results of this study are markedly different from those found in
the studies of Wooldridge [9] and Nicholson [5], The experimental response
appears fairly weak, and its sign varies substantially across ethnicities.
Only in the case of blacks does there appear to be evidence of a possible
experimental effect among experimentals receiving small or zero amounts of
payments (e.g., those over-breakeven). Unlike black experimental responses
that have been found in other areas of analysis, this result does not appear
to reflect a poor performance on the part of black controls. Even after
excluding the five black controls v'io bought their own homes, the home buying
rate among black controls was .2500, which is substantially larger than the
rates for white or Spanish-speaking controls. While the exact explanation
for these divergent results between studies is not certain, a number of
possible candidates exist.
First, it seems that part of the explanation must lie in differences
in the various samples used. Both Wooldridge' s and Nicholson's results
most likely contain at least some experimental mobility effect. For the
sample used here, a mobility effect appears present only for blacks. The
proportion of experimentals for whites, blacks, and Spanish-speakers are
.5678, .6915, and .6066, respectively, compared to the corresponding
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proportions .5839, .6453, and .6242 in the parent continuous 693 sample.
It seems that Nicholson in some sei.je captures the spirit of the sample
selection procedure used here, by using a pre-enrollment homeownership
dummy. Since homeowners are less inclined to move, this dummy helps to
distinguish the effects of the mover part of the sample. Also along the
lines of sample selection, the ethnic pooling used by both Wooldridge and
Nicholson in the face of the repeatedly large ethnic differences found in
other analyses, notably in the area of consumption (see Metcalf and
Nicholson [3]), must be an important factor.
Second the estimation techniques vary across studies Nicholson
uses the ordinary least squares linear probability model exclusively, and
Wooldridge uses both probit analysis and the former. This author's choice
to use probit analysis exclusively is based on the well-known inappropriate-
ness of the linear probability model for a model with a binary dependent
variable. One important distinction between these two models is that the
probit model is interactive, whereas the linear probability model is addi-
A Si
tive. For the probit model,
,]_ f , a\n » which clearly depends on the
dxji j *
levels of all Independent variables.
Third, all three studies suffer from some methodological problems.
Wooldridge and Nicholson analyze their inherently panel data problems
by running separate cross sections at different points In time. While
this procedure is inefficient, it must be admitted that the use of probit
analysis on panel data is a difficult question. However, if one does not
object to using the linear probability model, then all the standard panel
data techniques are available. As noted earlier, the sample selection
utilized here eliminates (for the most part) this panel data problem.

-22-
On the other hand, tnr ethnic depooiing used here has of course re-
sulted in some rather small sample sizes. Whether these sample sizes are
large enough to justify the use of large sample maximum likelihood proper-
ties is unclear.
Fourth and finally, some of the poorest data in the experiment i3 the
housing and housing debt drta. This has also been noted by both Wooldridge
[9] and Nicholson [5]. The problems that all authors necessarily face in
piecing together often contradicting information must be expected to intro-
duce unintentional- data differences — the effects of which are unknown.
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6 . Appendix
Tat e Al
White Sample
Paterson- Jersey
Trenton Paasaic City Scranton Total
First year 2 9 2 27 40
Experimentals (I) 2(1.0) 8(.89) K.50) 18(.67) 29(.73)
Second year 1 3 2 23 29
Experimentals (X) 1(1.0) 3(1.0) 0(0.0) 12(.52) 16(.55)
Third year 1 3 4 41 49
Experimentals (Z) 1(1.0) 3(1.0) 3(.75) 15(.37) 22 (.45)
Total 4 15 8 91 118
Experimentals (%) 4(1.0) 14(.93) 4(.50) 45 (.49) 67(.57)
Table A2
Hone-Buying Among Whites
F terson- Jersey
Trenton Passaic City Scranton Total
First year 5 1 6 12
Experimentals ("/.) 0(0.0) 4(.80) 0(0.0) 6(1.0) 8(.89)
Second year 1 1 6 8
Experimentas (%) 1(1.0) 1(1.0) 0(0.0) 3(.15) 4(.67)
Third year 1 1 5 7
Experimentals (%) 1(1.0) 1(1.0) 0(0.0) K.17) 3(.38)
Total 2 7 1 17 27
Experimentals (Z) 2(1.0) 6 (.86) 0(0.0) 10(.59) 18(.67)
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Table A7
Mortgage Rates
Paterson-
Passaic
Jersey
CityYear Trenton Scranton
1 7.49 8.05
2 8.385 8.415
3 7.60 7.67
8.265
8.08
7.64
8.43
7.70
7.44
Table A8
Calender Time
Paterson- Jersey
Year Trenton Passaic City Scranton
1 7 12 16.5 19
2 19.5 24.5 29 30.5
3 31 35.5 40 43
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Tabli2 A3
Black j) itr.ple
Paterson- Jersey
Trenton Passalc City Total
First year 8 8 28 44
Experimentals (X) 5(.63) 7(.88) 19(.68) 31(.70)
Second year 4 6 11 22
Experimental C-) 2 (.50) 4(.67) 8(.73) 14(.64)
Third year . 2 9 15 28
Experimentals 0(0.0) 8(.89) 12 (.80) 20(.71)
Total 17 23 54 94
Experimentals (30 7(.41) 19 (.83) 39 (.72) 65(.69)
Table A4
Home-Buying Among Blacks
Paterson- Jersey
Trenton Passaic City Total
First year
Experimentals ("0
Second year
Experimentals (2)
Third year
Experimentals (X)
3 3
2(.67) 3(1.0)
2 5
K.50) 3(.60)
3 2
0(0.0) 2(1.0)
10 16
9(.90) 14(.88)
10 17
7(.70) 1K.65)
2 7
2(1.0) 4(.57)
22 40
18(.82) 29(. 73)
Total
Experimental* (7.)
8 10
3(.38) 8(.80)
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Tablc A5
Spanish-Spt.diking Sample
Paterson- Jersey
Trenton Passai c City Total
First year 2 10 10 22
Experimentals cz) 2(1.0) 6(.60) 3(.30) 1K.50)
Second year 3 4 7 14
Experiment i] s (Z) 3(1.0) 4(1. 0) 2(.28) 9(.64)
Third year - 2 9 14 25
Experimentals (Z) 2(1.0) 7(.78) 8(.57) 17(.68)
Total 7 23 31 61
Experimentals (Z) 7(1.0) 17(.74) 13(.42) 37(.61)
Table A6
Home-Buying Among Spanish-Speaking
Paterson- Jersey
Trenton Passaic City Total
First year 1 1 2 4
Experimentals {%) 1(1.0) 1(1.0) 0(0.0) 2(.50)
Second year 3 3
Experiment . (Z) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) K.33) K.33)
Thi rd year 3 2 5
Experimentals 0(0.0) 2C.67) K.50) 3(.60)
Total 1 4 7 12
Experiment. (Z) .0) 3(.75) 2(.28) 6(.50)
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Table A
7
Mortgage Rates
r 'r—
erson-
~i -
•
Year Trout Lc • Scranton
1 7.49 8.05
-
8.265 8.43
2 8. - 8.415 8.08 7.70
3 7.60 7.67 7.64 7.44
Table A8
Calender Time
Year Trenton
racerson-
Passaic
Jersey
City Scranton
1 7 12 16.5 19
2 19.5 24.5 29 30.5
3 31 35.5 40 43
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Table A9
Problt Coefficients With Standard Errors In Parcnth«e«a
Coefficient Variable
Black
(movers only)
Whites
(Scranton onlv)
A
J,
s.
Constant
Normal Income
Work-conditioned Income
Prior ovr.ei dummy
Public housing dummy
Number of kld9 ages 6-15
Family size - 2 - kids 6-15
Head's age
Paterson-Paaeaic dummy
Jersey City dummy
Calender time
Mortgage rate
Experimental dummy
Experimental payments
Experimental time
(Experimental dummy)
(Head's ai;e)
(Experimental d'inny)
*(Work-concii t ionod income;
18.28**
(7.174)
-.6425
(.«05?)
-1.245
(.9359)
.07206
(.05310)
1.311
(.7987)
5.944**
(2.439)
-.2941
(.2462)
-.9187
(.6553)
-.09630*
(.05539)
.2041
(.3833)
30.93
(23.53)
.3768*** .2335*
(.1095) (.1213)
-.2600 -.8594
(.3356) (.6591)
.6489 .1091
(.7293) (.7964)
-.006084 .3324
(.4689) (.6359)
.1906 -.05647
(.1318) (.2260)
-.1334 .08571
(.1614) (.3228)
.08875** -.1759**
(.04518) (.06977)
-.07112
(.09586)
-3.246
(2.777)
-6.121*
(3.538)
.6292*
(.3406)
-1.680
(1.353)
.2263***
(.08233)
-.4888
(1.285)
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Table A10
Probit Statistics
Statistic Descripi Lon
blacks Whites
(movers only) (Scranton only)
n
m
k-1
L
Sample size
Number o: rs
Degrees of freec
Log-likelihood
-2* (log-likellhooci ratio)
83 91
29 17
16 14
32.26 -20.95
42.90*** 45.74***
Table All
Likelihood Ratio Tests
Number Description
Blacks Whites
(movers only) (Scranton only)
Work-conditioned income
ce, 3 20 o)
Prior tenure
(B. - S - 0)
Family characteristics
(S
6
3
7
- fc
3
- 0)
Head's age
8 1 9
Site
Calender time and mortgage rate
(B
:2 Bn 0,
Exper; i variables
..- I., 0)«»
BxpexinentaJ Lnt tractions
.6446
.8536
9.273**
4.618*
2.112
3.754
11.58**
3.410
5.591*
3.494
15.80***
16.97***
1.677
17.20***
11.90***
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Footnote9
*The author is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of
Illinois at Urb ana-Champaign. Part of the research that went into this study
was performed while the author was a Visiting Assistant Professor at the
Institute for Research on Foverty in Madison, Wisconsin during the summer of
1974. He wishes to express his gratitude to Helen Lowry of the University of
Illinois for her help in implementing the probit computer package used in this
study. Thanks are also owed to Robert Avery, Joseph Hotz, and Harold Watts
of the University of Wisconsin at Madison and Douglas Bendt and Judith Wooldridge
of Mathematics Inc. for their thoughtful comments.
^Wooldridge [9, p. 38].
2
Further doubt is cast on any type of supply side explanation by the re-
cent findings of Robert Avery. Avery conducted personal interviews with lend-
ing institutions in all sites* and found little, if any, awareness on their
part of the experiment.
3
See for example Carliner [1], Kain and Quigby [2],Reid [7], and Morgan
[4].
As Metcalf and Nicholson [3, p. 5] and Reid [7, p. 11] have noted, the
main proponent of the permanent income concept, Milton Friedman, has used
three year income averages as proxies for permanent income implying that
individuals may only have <\ three year time horizon.
See Kain and Quigley [2, p. 273].
In the models considered in this study this independence assumption
may be slightly violated since a small protion of the samples appear more
than once. Specifically, 16 white, 10 black, and 8 Spanish-speaking families
appear more than once.
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In Watts [8] the natural logarithm of normal Income is estimated.
Here normal income itself is used. Since In y - N(p,a 2 ) implies E(y) -
1 I
exp(p+ X0 )i the "blowing-up" procedure took into account the estimated
standard deviation of a family's income from their normal income.
8
See Watts [8].
9
Normal income is also serving as a proxy for assets. Unfortunately,
the financial asset series constructed by Metcalf and Nicholson [3] is only
available at pre-enrollment and quarters two, six, and ten. Hence, for ex-
ample, for a family itt Trenton who bought in the second year, it is not possible
to determine whether their asset figure refers to before or after they bought.
This is not viewed as a major shortcoming since as Nicholson [5, pp. 13-14]
notes, the average family stock holdings of stocks, bonds, and savings accounts
was only $140, and that of cash was $31. The major asset for these families
is their house if they own one, and prior ownership is included as an inde-
pendent variable.
Wooldridge [9] states that for her sample "18.8 and 24.8 per cent
of moves were made because of poor conditions or condemned housing in respec-
tively the last and penultimate moves of families (from the tenth quarterly
interview) ."
Since the time period involved is a year, it is not even clear how
to construct an 'over-breakeven* dummy except for families who were over-
breakeven the entire year. Since even experimentals over-breakeven received
fees for reporting their incomes (this -amounted to $260 a year for the family
over-breakeven the entire year) over breakeven experimentals are also dif-
ferentiated from controls.
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12
Actually there were tVH bleck families in Scronton who moved. How-
ever, i Lee in other studies, they have been omitted
from the . La.
The three possible ethnic : i ie conb inat ions (whites and blacks,
whites and Spanish-speakers . and blacks and Spanish-speakers) were also tested
separately for depoolir.g. This yielded test statistics of 38.63, 33.75, and
28.30, respectively, which are significant at the .5, 1.0, and 2.5 percent
levels. Furthermore, the Bonferroni joint testing procedure indicates that
the simultaneous significance level for these three tests is at most 4.0
percent
.
14
Furthermore the ethnic proportions of .4322, .3443, and .2234 for
whites, blacks, and Spanish-speakers, respectively, are close to the corres-
ponding ethnic proportions of .4473, .3377, and .2150 in the parent continuous
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